by Jeff Price, Metropolitan State University of Denver, [This article first appeared in The Conversation, republished with permission]
An incident in which a FlyDubai pilot is said to have stabbed the captain with the intention of crashing a plane of mainly Israeli passengers has shone a light on flight security.
Reports suggest that passengers on the plane were able to enter the cockpit, subduing the alleged attacker before the plane was safely diverted to a Saudi runway. Israeli fighter jets were scrambled in response to the incident.
What do airlines do to prevent incidents like this one?
I’m an aviation security expert with 40 years’ experience in the industry. My expertise is in how the U.S. system works. But much of what has been put in place in the U.S. after the terrorist attacks of 9/11 have been implemented in some form as best practice across the world.
The 2001 attacks – in which terrorists stormed the cockpits of four passenger jets, crashing three into targets, with the fourth being brought down after passengers fought with the hijackers – saw the U.S. and global airline industry change its protocols and safety measures to protect the cockpit from outside threats. Insider threats, however, remain a problem.
Here is how airlines and authorities mitigate the risks:
Preemployment and continuing vetting
All pilots and flight attendants in the U.S. must undergo criminal history record checks and security threat assessments to determine if they’ve been convicted of a major crime or are otherwise a potential threat to aviation.
These checks are more vigorous than before 9/11, when pilots and cabin staff were only subjected to employment history checks.
Identity verification and controlled access
All U.S. flight crew members must also undergo an identity verification process when hired. They access airports through a designated crew member access point. Although this means they technically bypass the passenger screening process, crew members are subject to random physical screening by the Transportation Security Administration.
The reality is that if a flight crew member wanted to commit a criminal act, they may already have the access they need, but at some point the final layer of security is trusting the people in charge of the plane.
While the potential for random checks may prevent a crew member from having a weapon, it still doesn’t prevent all efforts should a determined crew member want to commit an act of terrorism. In 2015, for example, the pilot of a Germanwings flight locked the captain out of the cockpit when he went to the lavatory, then crashed the plane into the French Alps.
Arming flight crew
There are also some pilots who fly with firearms under the Federal Flight Deck Officer program, created through the Homeland Security Act of 2002. Under the terms of the program, the Federal Aviation Administration certified that pilots can “use firearms to defend against an act of criminal violence and air piracy while attempting to gain control of an aircraft.” To be eligible, flight crew members must pass biannual firearms requalifications, undergo training and have a medical certificate.
Prior to 9/11, pilots and flight attendants were not subjected to passenger-style screening and the Federal Flight Deck Officer program did not exist.
Security training
Current TSA regulations require recurrent security training for flight crew and cabin crew members, which includes self-defense training and exercises on how to handle a hijacking.
This is different from the training pre 9/11, when crew members were taught how to comply with hijackers. Now, the focus is on active resistance and defending the flight deck.
Hardened cockpit
Flight deck doors pre-9/11 were often just as flimsy as the lavatory doors. After the attack, flight deck doors were hardened to provide a significant barrier against anyone outside the cockpit trying to get in. In the case of FlyDubai Flight FZ1073, it has been reported that the wounded captain was able to release the door lock, allowing passengers in.
New airplanes in the U.S. are also required to have a secondary physical barrier protecting the cockpit when the flight deck door is opened.
But this does nothing if a criminal or terrorist is already inside the cockpit. The fact is, most security measures are to prevent passengers from accessing the cockpit, and very little is done to prevent pilots from taking over the plane.
Historically it has happened, but not very often and not often enough that someone has figured out how to prevent it from happening.
You can put an air marshal in the cockpit, but what if they are compromised, too? At some point you have to trust people, and the U.S. system is largely based on that.
Jeff Price, Professor iof Aviation and Aerospace Science, Metropolitan State University of Denver
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.